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Task Force ReportThe ISPOR GoodModeling Task Force, like other ISPOR task forces,
was created to advance the field of health care outcomes research
and to promote the utilization of outcomes research in making
health care decisions. It is, however, unique in being the first task
force to represent joint recommendations of ISPOR and the Society
for Medical Decision Making. This collaboration represents an
important milestone in the development of good practice recom-
mendations. Currently, another such collaboration is ongoing—
the Comparative Effectiveness Research-Collaborative Initiative—
involving ISPOR, theAcademyofManagedCare Pharmacy, and the
National Pharmaceutical Council—aiming to develop greater uni-
formity and transparency in the evaluation and use of outcomes
research in health care coverage and decisionmaking through the
development of a user-friendly toolkit. Such partnerships not only
make use of talent residing in multiple organizations but also en-
large the credibility and practical applications of task force recom-
mendations.
The use of models in the support of scientific endeavors is a
powerful tool, especially when the phenomena under scrutiny
elude direct observation. George Box in this context observed that
all models are wrong, but some are useful [1]. Similarly Niels Bohr,
the great builder of models within physics, quipped that it is hard
tomake predictions, especially about the future [2].Within clinical
or health care policy decisionmaking, peering into the future (e.g.,
predicting the lifetime consequences of health care decisions) is of
paramount importance. Thus, models are working hypotheses
about reality that should andmust be revised asmore information
is obtained. The Task Force is alert to the limitations of models as
simplifications representing “some aspects of reality at a sufficient
level of detail to inform a clinical or policy decision.” As such, all
models carry an unstated caveat: that their predictions hold true
only so long as their key assumptions are correct and that the
models are free of important unknown confounders.Weneed only
look back to the Office of Technology Assessment’s 1995 report,
“The Effectiveness and Costs of Osteoporosis Screening and Hor-
mone Replacement Therapy [HRT]” [3], to illustrate this point. This
report’s results were very sensitive to the presumed salutary ef-
fects of HRT on cardiovascular risk. We now know that the impact
of HRT on cardiovascular risk is by nomeans as straightforward as
explored in this model. The HRT episode highlights one of the key
virtues of models: they help us focus on the critical assumptions
that drive the models’ results. A model is credible only to the de-
gree that its assumptions hold water—especially the assumption
that no important unknown confounders are at play.
The Task Force places a central focus on model credibility as
opposed to model robustness. Model credibility can be most sim-
ply put in Bayesian terms: if the results of the model are counter-
intuitive, are the results sufficiently compelling to alter one’s sub-
sequent actions? When models confirm our intuitions, theySource of financial support: The authors have no other financial relstimulate less curiosity; simplermodelswill generally be preferred
in these circumstances because of their greater transparency.
Indeed, complexity always carries the potential to undermine
model credibility as decision makers do not like “black boxes.” As
the field has moved from the predominant use of decision-tree
models to the routine application of state-transitionmodels to the
more recent adoption of discrete event simulationmodels, we ob-
serve that the ability of many decision makers to understand the
inner working of models has fallen dramatically. The Task Force
appropriately notes that “model simplicity is desirable for trans-
parency, ease of validation and description,” but also that the
modelmust be “sufficiently complex to answer the question at the
level of detail consistent with the problem being modeled.”
While the use of progressively more complex models over
the past 25 years has proved useful in many cases, this com-
plexity has not always been justified. In numerous instances,
complex models have generated the same results as “back of
the envelope” calculations. One piece of evidence that supports
this observation is the study demonstrating that quality-adjust-
ing life-years mattered only in a minority of cost-effectiveness
analyses [4]. It is far from clear that modelers in general inves-
tigate systematically whether or not more complex models pro-
vide significantly improved insights to decision makers, as
would be necessary to justify the loss of transparency as well as
the additional effort expended in developing these complex
models. While complexity may be demanded by some decision
makers, many others would opt for greater transparency if the
sacrifice with respect to accuracy were tolerable.
This Task Force should be credited with providing a set of
guidelines that are probably the best and certainly the most cur-
rent among those available, to assist model users and model re-
viewers in the evaluation of models. As noted, these guidelines
reflect current best practice and will require updating as method-
ological development moves forward. The Task Force’s recom-
mendations are not a simple checklist; a level of sophistication
both about the clinical issue under examination and about how
models function is required to appropriately evaluate models and
their results.
The Task Force appropriately recommends that models in-
clude reasonable estimates of parameters and parameter uncer-
tainty. This issue may bear greater scrutiny than discussed in the
Task Force report.While documenting credible sources for param-
eter estimates and the use of sensitivity analyses are de rigeur, the
Task Force could have commented more on how sensitivity anal-
yses could be employed to highlight to end users of models the
importance of critical assumptions through an examination of
how results vary when the sensitivity analysis uses a maximal
range of parameter estimates. End users—especially a nonmod-
eler reader—would benefit from seeing a model pushed to its lim-
its. Indeed, I have often found that published models employationships to disclose.
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plausible, do not explore all potential scenarios of interest. And
while one-way and two-way sensitivity analyses have given
way to probabilistic sensitivity analyses, the causes of transpar-
ency and reducing decision-maker uncertainty might be better
served by a “best-case, worst-case” sensitivity analysis. But per-
haps the most challenging conundrum for the credibility of
complex models—as the Task Force notes—is the difficulty in
providing an adequate sensitivity analysis for “structural un-
certainly”: how are we to understand the sometimes conflicting
results from different models that appear well designed and
that address the same issue?
Model users are left with proxymeasures for model credibility,
such as the reputation of themodel’s creators and the potential for
conflicts of interest. In addition, model users gain confidence in a
model’s output when they can manipulate the model itself
through changing the input parameters and/or aspects of the
model’s structure to gain a feel for how it operates. In this regard,
the discussion of transparency and intellectual property within
the Task Force’s report is particularly salient.
Finally, it is crucial that the community of modelers effectively
educate end users—including researchers, health care decision
makers, health care providers, and patients—regarding the appro-
priate use and limitations of models. A model is one important
source of information to heedwithin awell-designed, deliberative,
and transparent decision process. No model directly provides theultimate answer to our fundamental question, “What is the right
thing to do?”—nor would experienced modelers claim that.
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